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The aim of this paper is to compare dierent policy instruments for cost-eective habitat
conservation on agricultural lands, when the desired spatial pattern of reserves is a random
mosaic. We use a spatially explicit mathematical programming model which studies the
farmers' behavior as prot maximizers under technical and administrative constraints. Fac-
ing dierent policy measures, each farmer chooses its land-use at the eld level, which deter-
mines the landscape at the regional level. A spatial pattern index (Ripley L function) is then
associated to the obtained landscape, indicating on the degree of dispersion of the reserve.
We compare a subsidy per hectare of reserve with an auction scheme and an agglomeration
malus. We nd that the auction is superior to the uniform subsidy both for cost-eciency
and for the spatial pattern of the reserve. The agglomeration malus does better than the
auction for the spatial pattern but is more costly.
Keywords: agri-environmental policies, biodiversity, mathematical programming, spatial
optimization, reserve design, cost-eciency.
JEL Classication: H23, Q57, Q12, Q28
1 Introduction
Over the last fty years, farmed landscapes have experienced dramatic changes, mainly due to
mechanization and intensication of farming techniques, increases in the use of chemicals and
increases in the size of agricultural elds. As a result, natural habitats have been transformed,
leading to many species' decline (S $<derstr $<m and Part 2000). Common farmland birds in
Europe, for instance, have been declining by 25% over the last two decades (Gregory et al.
2005).
In farmlands, dominated by private ownership, providing sucient incentives to landowners
to inuence their land-use decisions towards biodiversity preservation is thus essential. Agri-
environmental policies have progressively been introduced for example in Europe (eg. Natura
2000) and in the United States (eg. the Conservation Reserve Program) to preserve habitats. In
designing these policies, the economic issue lies in the trade-o between environmental eciency
(measured in units like acres/hectares of protected area) and economic costs (opportunity costs1,
compensation payments to farmers, transaction costs). Moreover, the spatial conguration of
the reserve sites matters for the persistence of species. A given number of acres of protected
area does not have the same ecologic impact when it is fragmented, agglomerated or distributed
as a random mosaic. The best spatial pattern depends on the considered specie: the grizzly
bear would prefer an agglomerated reserve for instance whereas a black-footed ferret survives
better on dispersed reserves (see Parkhurst and Shogren 2007; see also Soule and Simberlo
1986 for insights on the famous SLOSS debate: Single Large or Several Small reserves).
The aim of this paper is to compare dierent policy instruments for cost-eective habitat
conservation on agricultural lands, when the desired spatial pattern of reserves is a random
mosaic. This spatial pattern is adapted to certain threatened bird species that breed on agri-
cultural lands, such as the Little Bustard (Tetrax Tetrax), an Annex 1 specie of the European
Union Birds Directive (79/409/EEC).
Many studies have been devoted to optimal reserve design, mainly in the eld of conservation
biology (see Williams et al. 2005, for a general review; see Wossink et al. 1999, and van Wenum
et al. 2004, for a more specic analysis of agricultural lands). These contributions have focused
1The opportunity costs of habitat conservation can be dened as the forgone prots due to implementing a
reserve (eg. grassland) instead of another more protable land-use (eg. cropland). We dene here the "reserve"
in a general way, i.e. as all sites characterized by environment-friendly land-uses and management options.
2on the question of where the reserve should be located to adequately (and cost-eciently2)
protect the biodiversity. However, they do not address the question of "how to get there".
They implicitly assume that the social planner has perfect knowledge on all costs and selects
reserve sites minimizing opportunity costs. Unfortunately, governmental agencies have imperfect
information on private costs and cannot implement the rst-best reserve location in a direct
way (Lewis et al. 2009).
Designing incentive-based conservation policies, aiming at a cost-ecient reserve under in-
formation asymmetries, is thus a further step in reserve design. Many articles have examined
this issue using mechanism design theory but without taking into account the spatial char-
acteristics of the conserved area (Smith 1995; Bourgeon et al. 1995; Wu and Babcock 1996;
Moxey et al. 1999; Ozanne et al. 2001). Recent contributions have introduced the spatial
aspects. Lewis and Plantinga (2007), Lewis et al. (2008) and Lewis et al. (2009) examine
incentive-based policies to reduce habitat fragmentation. Among other things, our analysis dif-
fers from these authors' as they use an econometric model to estimate the farmers' decisions
(conversion probabilities based on passed observations) while we explicitly detail the farmers'
behavior as a prot-maximizer. W $<tzold and Drechsler (2005) and Drechsler et al. (2007)
measure the losses due to implementing uniform payments whereas the costs and environmental
benets of conservation are spatially heterogenous. However, these analysis do not model the
farmer's behavior facing dierent policy measures and the resulting conguration of the reserve.
Smith and Shogren (2002), Parkhurst et al. (2002) and Parkhurst and Shogren (2007, 2008)
have investigated the eciency of agglomeration bonuses paid to farmers when they locate a
reserve on a parcel adjacent to another reserve3. These articles, mainly based on experimental
economics, examine whether rational individuals can achieve coordination but do not look into
the mechanism that drives the farmers' decisions.
We use a spatially explicit mathematical programming model (called OUTOPIE) in which
the farmer maximizes its prot under several technical and administrative constraints. This
behavior leads to land-use choices at the eld level and eventually generates a landscape at the
regional level. A spatial pattern index (Ripley L function) is then associated to the obtained
landscape, indicating on the degree of dispersion of the reserve. See Bami $<re et al. (2011) for
a detailed description of the OUTOPIE model.
Mathematical programming farm-level models have largely been used to assess the eciency
of agri-environmental policies (Wossink et al. 1999; Falconer and Hodge 2001; van Wenum et
al. 2004; Ekman 2005; Havlik et al. 2005). Our model diers in that it takes into account,
in addition to the farm-level, both the eld and landscape levels, linked to a spatial pattern
indicator. As we have explained above, taking into account these three levels is essential when
analyzing biodiversity conservation: the eld is the elementary unit of the spatial pattern,
the farm is the landowner's decision level, and the resulting landscape level determines the
environmental result.
Our model is applied to a Natura 2000 site in France (Plaine de Niort), which aims at pro-
tecting the Little Bustard. This bird relies exclusively on insects found in temporary grasslands,
and preferentially breeds in an arable landscape constituted of a mosaic of alfalfa, grasslands
and annual crop elds (Wol et al. 2001). It's conservation therefore implies a random mosaic
of extensively managed grasslands and annual crops. While contiguity and connectivity have
often been studied (Wossink et al 1999, Nalle et al 2004), to the best of our knowledge this work
is one of the rst attempts to account for a random mosaic distribution of the reserves (see also
Bami $<re et al. 2011).
2An extension of the basic literature to the eld of economics has consisted in incorporating land costs (Ando
et al. 1998; Polasky et al. 2008).
3This helps reduce reserve fragmentation which is often seen as harmful for species conservation.
3We assume the environmental objective is to reach a given percentage of land enrolled in
the reserve (i.e. covered by extensively managed grassland), with reserve patches forming a
random mosaic. We then compare various policy instruments - a subsidy per hectare of reserve,
an auction scheme and an agglomeration malus - to reach this objective.
The subsidy, which has previously been studied in Bami $<re et al. (2011), is a payment to
the farmer per hectare of reserve implemented on his/her land. The auction scheme works as
a procurement auction where farmers indicate the minimum payment they wish to receive to
convert one parcel of their land to reserve. The public regulator selects the lowest amount and
pays it to the winning farmer against one parcel in reserve. By favoring competition among
farmers, this instrument may improve cost-eciency even when the regulator does not detain
detailed information on the individual opportunity costs. It's use in conservation policies has
increasingly attracted the attention of economists (Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort
1997, 1998; Latacz-Lohman and Schilizzi 2005; Thoyer and Said 2007; Glebe 2008; Ferraro 2008).
The agglomeration malus is an instrument which accounts for the spatial issue. It consists in a
subsidy per hectare of reserve completed with a malus (i.e. a reduction of the payment) when
the additional reserve site is adjacent to another reserve site. This malus is relevant in cases,
such as ours, where the desired pattern of the reserve is dispersed. As mentioned before, some
authors have examined a similar instrument, an agglomeration bonus (which is relevant when
the desired pattern is agglomerated), using experimental economics (Parkhurst et al. 2002;
Parkhurst and Shogren 2007, 2008).
We nd that, in the framework of our model, the auction does better than the subsidy to
minimize payments to farmers and regarding the spatial pattern of lands. The agglomeration
malus reaches a better spatial pattern than the auction but is more costly.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. First, we present our modeling approach
and our method in comparing policy instruments. Then, we introduce an auction scheme and
compare it to the subsidy per hectare. Next, we study the agglomeration malus and compare
it with the two other instruments. Conclusions and scope for further research are given in the
last section.
2 The mathematical programming model
OUTOPIE (OUTil pour l'Optimisation des PrairIes dans l'Espace) is a mixed integer linear
programming model which accounts for three spatial levels: the eld, the farm and the region.
Fields are characterized by their soil type, irrigation equipment and the farm to which they
belong. This determines the agricultural activities and cropping techniques that can be chosen
on each eld, as well as the resulting yield and gross margin. The farm is the level at which
decisions concerning land allocation are made, taking into account policy constraints (e.g. milk
quotas and obligatory set-asides) and technical constraints (e.g. feed requirements). Spatial
relationships between elds, constituting the landscape, are accounted for at the regional level.
The model includes the major crops (wheat, winter barley, sunower, rapeseed, maize, and
sorghum), permanent and temporary grasslands, including alfalfa, and set-aside lands. The
reserve is dened here as all lands covered with alfalfa and temporary or permanent grassland,
managed in an environment-friendly way4.
The model maximizes the sum of all farms' gross margins including incomes and costs due
to the participation in an agri-environmental program, subject to eld, farm and landscape
level constraints. This is represented in program (1), where Xf;i;r is the level of farm activities
4We dene here an environment-friendly management as a Little Bustard-friendly management, characterized
by restrictions on livestock density, fertilization, pesticides, and mowing dates.
4for farm f, on eld i, enrolled (or not) in reserve type r (i.e. in one of the environment-
friendly managed grassland); f is the farm's gross margin from agricultural activities; cpr is
the compensation payment for an enrolment in reserve type r; vtcr is a variable transaction cost
per hectare of reserve; ftc is a xed private transaction cost for program participation and RPf







(cpr   vtcr)Xf;i;r   ftc)RPf] (1)
s:t:Field(Xf;i;r);Farm(Xf;i;r);Landscape(Xf;i;r)
This model is applied to a Natura 2000 site located in Plaine de Niort, in Poitou-Charente,
France. This area was traditionally dedicated to mixed farming but has recently undergone a
rapid specialization in crop production, threatening some populations of birds such as the Little
Bustard (Tetrax Tetrax). The whole Natura 2000 site is about 20 000 hectares (ha) but we
have chosen to concentrate on a restricted stylized area of 2 700 ha divided in 900 elds of 3 ha
each (see Figure 1). There are three main groups of soils in Plaine de Niort - calcareous valley,
deep and shallow plain soils - with dierent agricultural potentials. They are represented on
the map (Figure 1) according to the ratio and layout observed. We considered 12 crop growing
farms and 6 mixed dairy farms, both types being located on all types of soils and some of them
having the possibility to irrigate a xed set of contiguous elds. More details can be found on
the description and the validation of the OUTOPIE model, as well as on the case study, in
Bami $<re et al (2011).
Figure 1: Model representation of the studied area (18 farms; 3 soil types)
In order to account for the spatial pattern of the obtained reserve, the model has been
completed with a spatial indicator. According to some ecologist experts (Bretagnolles et al.
2009), the most suitable spatial pattern for Little Bustard conservation can be described as
at least 15% of land covered by extensively managed grassland patches (3 ha being the ideal
eld size), randomly or regularly located within any radius between 100 and 1000 meters. As a
consequence, we need to measure not only the size but also the shape of the reserve generated
by the model. In order to do so, we use an indicator based on Ripley K and L functions (Ripley
1977, 1981). Theses functions measure both the density of the reserve and the distances between
reserve sites. They are widely used in plant ecology (Haase 1995). Results can be interpreted as
follows (see Figure 2 for two spatial distributions of the reserve and for the associated values of
the Ripley function L): a) if L remains within the condence envelope (dotted lines) then the
spatial pattern of the reserve is signicantly (Poisson) random; b) if L is above the upper limit
5of the condence envelope, then the spatial pattern is clustered or aggregated. More details are
given on the Ripley indicator in Bami $<re et al (2011).
Figure 2: Spatial distribution of 135 reserve plots on a 900 plots grid: a) random, b) aggregated.
Ripley L function for the random (a) and aggregated (b) distributions
3 A comparison of policy instruments
We now use our modeling approach to compare dierent policy instruments in order to reach a
given environmental objective. This objective, consistent with ecologists' recommendation for
the Little Bustard, is 15% of land covered with reserve and reserve patches randomly dispersed
(i.e. the Ripley function must be in - or as close as possible to - the condence envelop).
The policy instruments are compared according to two criteria. First, we compare the
total costs of reaching the 15% objective (cost-eciency). Second, we compare the spatial
conguration of the obtained reserve (spatial eciency). We have chosen to consider both these
criteria independently without giving a priority to one or the other5.
Regarding the total costs of the policy, we rst consider the private costs. These are the
sum of the opportunity costs - or forgone prots - incurred by farmers when converting their
lands to reserve. These costs are minimized when converting rst the low quality lands, as these
lands have a lower associated gross margin. The three instruments we compare are incentive-
based instruments that let the farmers choose which parcel they convert to reserve. As the
prot-maximizing farmer always chooses to convert rst the cheapest parcels, total opportunity
costs are automatically minimized. Therefore, the minimization of private costs is not a dis-
criminatory criteria among the instruments we study. We next consider the public costs of the
policy. These are dened as the sum of the compensation payments to farmers. We assume we
wish to compensate farmers for the costs of reserve implementation6. However, we assume the
policy-maker does not know the opportunity costs associated with each eld. She then cannot
calculate the cost of the reserve for each farmer. Moreover, farmers are not willing to reveal
their real costs as, by communicating higher levels, they would increase their compensation
payment (adverse selection). As a result, the public regulator cannot pay the exact amount
compensating the farmers' costs. We will see how some instruments deal better than others
5The relative weight given to each objective depends on the importance for society of this bird specie's survival
(and on the exact role of the spatial pattern in its probability of survival) compared to budgetary expenditures.
These considerations go beyond the scope of our analysis.
6This is consistent with the idea of remunerating them for an environmental service to society.
6with this issue. Contrarily to Bami $<re et al. (2011), we ignore public transaction costs7 -
due for instance to the implementation of the policy and to payments to farmers. These costs
are present in all instruments we analyze (whenever a policy is implemented and payments are
transferred) but we do not have the information on how they dier according to the instrument,
so it is not a discriminatory element. This point is discussed in the concluding section.
Regarding the spatial objective, we look at which instrument reaches the closest Ripley L
value to the condence envelop.
The subsidy per hectare of reserve has been studied in Bami $<re et al (2009). This in-
strument reaches the 15% objective with a total public cost of 279 thousand euros. Total
payments to landowners exceed their real opportunity costs due to imperfect information (the
subsidy rate is set so as to cover the cost of the most expensive parcel converted to reserve
whereas some cheaper parcels have been converted). As a result, the cost-eciency of the sub-
sidy per hectare is not optimal. Moreover, this subsidy does not reach a suitable conguration
of reserves: the Ripley function is largely outside the condence envelop (in bold on Figure
3). This is linked to the fact that the parcels with the lowest opportunity costs are rather
aggregated.
Figure 3: Reserve location and the Ripley L function with the subsidy per ha
We now consider other instruments that might improve the subsidy's result either on its
cost-eciency or on the spatial objective.
4 The auction scheme
Auction schemes have increasingly attracted the attention of policy-makers to deal with agri-
environmental regulation with incomplete information. Several real cases exist such as the
Conservation Reserve Program in the United States (Cummings et al. 2004; Kirwan et al.
2005), the Bush Tender in Australia (Stoneham et al. 2003) or some regional experiences in
Germany (Groth 2005). According to many economists, this policy instrument, by favoring
competition among farmers, helps minimize the payments to farmers even when they detain
private information on costs (see the references given in the introduction).
The auction we study here is a rst-price sealed bid auction which works as follows. First,
farmers indicate to the public regulator the minimum payment they wish to receive to accept
converting one parcel of their land to reserve. Their bid is sealed, meaning that the other
7We do consider private transaction costs paid by the farmers when participating to an agri-environmental
program. See equation (1).
7farmers cannot observe it. Second, the regulator selects the best oer, i.e. the lowest amount,
and pays this amount to the winning farmer against one additional parcel of reserve on his
land. If several farmers bid at the lowest amount, they all win the bidding and receive this
amount against one parcel of reserve. The operation is repeated until the total desired hectares
of reserve have been reached.
Our modeling of the auction is inspired from Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort
(1997)'s seminal work. For simplicity let us denote as 0
f the total gross margin of farm f
without any commitment on the reserves on his land and 1
f its total gross margin - not
including the compensation payment - when farm f commits to one additional parcel of reserve
on his land. 0
f   1
f represents the forgone prots of farm f (or opportunity costs) due to an
additional parcel of reserve. If farmer f submits a bid b in the auction scheme and if his bid is
accepted, its total gross margin is 1
f +b. Following Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort,
we assume that each farmer's bidding strategy is inuenced by its expectations on the threshold
bid  above which no bids are accepted. Those expectations, which are assumed to be identical
for all bidders, are characterized by a density function f(b) and a distribution function F(b).
The probability that a bid b is accepted is then:
P(b  ) =
Z  
b
f(u)du = 1   F(b)
where   denotes the upper limit on the bidders' expectations on the bid cap, i.e. the maximum
expected bid cap.













As shown in (2), when choosing its bid, the farmer makes a trade-o between net payos and
the acceptance probability. A higher bid increases the net payo but reduces the probability of
winning, and vice-versa.
Still following Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort, for the quantitative analysis, we
assume that the bidders expectations on the bid cap are uniformly distributed in the range [;  ]





f +  
2
;g (3)
s:t: b > 0
f   1
f (4)
As shown in (3), the optimal bid is an increasing function of the opportunity cost of participation
and of the expected bid cap. The constraint (4) accounts for the fact that the farmer will never
oer a bid which does not at least cover the extra cost of its commitment.
Using this simple auction model, we introduce this policy instrument in the OUTOPIE
model. The auction procedure is repeated until 15% of the zone has been enrolled in the
reserve. To avoid learning eects and collusion among bidders, we assume there is no diusion
of information between two auction rounds (i.e. the amount of the winning bid and the identity
of the winner are not revealed). As Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort, we assume
8that the range [;  ] is given by minus 40% to plus 40% of the average opportunity cost of an
additional parcel in reserve8.
We nd that the auction reaches the 15% objective with a total public cost of approximately
255 thousand euros. The auction therefore reaches a better cost-eciency than the subsidy,
which was 10% more expensive. There still is overcompensation of farmers compared to their real
costs as their bid equals their opportunity cost plus a value which depends on their expectations
of the bid cap. However, in our case, the overcompensation is lower with the auction than with
the subsidy. Regarding the spatial conguration of the reserve, the auction dos not reach the
exact desired pattern (see Figure 4 where the Ripley function is shown to be slightly outside
the condence envelop) although it does a little better than the subsidy.
Figure 4: Reserve location and the Ripley L function with the auction scheme
Let us now look into another policy instrument that explicitly takes into account the spatial
issue.
5 The agglomeration malus
For many species, the spatial conguration of the habitat reserve - and not only its total size - is
crucial for survival. There is no scientic consensus on the optimal spatial pattern of the reserve
- which depends on the specie - and only very few policy instruments have been developed to
take into consideration these spatial issues. In the emerging literature on the topic, the most
recurrent objective is to avoid reserve fragmentation. Parkhurst et al. (2002) and Parkhurst
and Shogren (2007, 2008) for instance examine an incentive mechanism called an agglomeration
bonus, which awards farmers bonus payments for the conservation of adjacent parcels9. These
authors use experimental economics to examine whether players are able to coordinate and
reach the desired spatial conguration of land when facing such an agglomeration bonus.
We focus here on a similar instrument but reversed, so as to take into account our objective
of a dispersed reserve: an agglomeration malus. We assume the farmers receive a payment
per hectare of reserve but pays a malus when the remunerated parcel is adjacent to an existing
8We assume farmers are able to estimate the average opportunity cost of one additional parcel in reserve in
the studied area.
9A real-world application of an agglomeration bonus is Oregon's Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program
(CREP), established in 1998 with the goal of assisting the recovery of salmon and trout species through the
creation of riparian buers along stream habitat (Grout 2010).
9reserve. We distinguish the parcels that are completely adjacent to the remunerated parcel from
those having only one corner in common with this parcel. He pays the whole malus and a lower
amount (say half the malus) respectively for the former and the latter.
We assume farmers can observe the existing parcels in reserve, as is consistent with reality.
However, they do not know which parcels their neighbors farmers will choose to put into reserve
simultaneously to their own decision, so they might have to pay an unexpected malus. But
we assume they take their decision considering only the existing reserve sites without building
expectations on the coming reserve sites.
We nd that this instrument reaches 15% of reserve with a total public cost of 283 thousand
euros. It therefore turns out to be more expensive than the standard subsidy and, a fortiori,
than the auction scheme. However, this instrument leads to a spatial pattern of lands very close
to the desired pattern (see Figure 5): the Ripley L function is inside the condence envelope,
except for the rst point (for a 200 meters radius) due to over-dispersion.
Figure 5: Reserve location and the Ripley L function with the agglomeration malus
6 Conclusion
We have compared three incentive-based policy instruments - a subsidy per ha of reserve, an
auction and an agglomeration malus - in order to reach a given size of reserve on agricultural
lands, with reserve patches forming a random mosaic. In the framework of our model, the
auction scheme has proven to be more ecient than the subsidy both for the public expenditures
and for the spatial pattern of the reserve. The agglomeration malus is more costly than the
subsidy and the auction but allows a better spatial pattern than both other instruments. As a
result, we cannot rank the auction compared to the agglomeration malus as the former is more
cost-ecient whereas the latter is more spatially ecient. We therefore observe a trade-o
between minimizing the public costs of the policy and reaching the desired spatial pattern of
reserves.
Our work can be improved in many directions. First, we could introduce other policy
instruments such as an heterogeneous payment scheme (based on mechanism design theory) or
a reserve trading scheme, both potentially improving cost-eciency. Second, we could improve
the design of the auction scheme so as to deal more specically with the spatial issue. This
includes revising the scoring of bids taking into account a selection criteria which depends on
the status of the adjacent parcel. Also, the public transaction costs of the agri-environmental
10policy could be added. This is important as an auction scheme or an agglomeration malus may
induce higher administrative costs than a standard subsidy, due to more complex procedures or
duplicated payments.
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